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Organizational safety resilience is a key factor in sustaining an effective safety management system (SMS) in highreliability organizations (HROs) such as aviation. Extant research advocates for monitoring, assessing and
continuously improving safety in an organization that has a fully-functional SMS. Safety resilience provides a buffer
against vulnerabilities. Extant research also suggests a paucity in terms of a measurement framework for
organizational safety resilience in collegiate aviation operations. A quantitative approach using Reason’s safety
resilience concept (Reason, 2011) is used to assess organizational safety resilience in a collegiate aviation program
with an active conformance SMS accepted by the FAA. A sample of 516 research participants responded to an
online survey instrument derived from Reason (2011). Structural Equation Model (SEM)/Path Analysis (PA)
techniques are used to assess models that measure the strength of relationships between three cultural drivers
(Commitment, Cognizance, Competence) of safety and safety resilience. There were strong significant relationships
between these cultural drivers and safety resilience. Path analysis suggests that Commitment significantly mediates
the path between Cognizance and Competence and highlights its important role in sustaining safety competencies.
There were significant differences in the perceptions of safety resilience among top-level leadership, flight
operations and ground operations. Flight operations and ground operations had higher mean scores on safety
resilience than top-level leadership. Study provides a validated model of safety resilience that is essential for SMS
improvements in collegiate aviation programs. Future studies will utilize this safety resilience model to assess other
collegiate aviation programs in various phases of SMS implementation, airlines, and air traffic control operations.
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A rapidly changing technological workspace and corresponding requirements for
acceptable-levels of safety in the aviation operational environment should be complemented by a
proactive safety culture and organizational resilience. Safety resilience is a characteristic of an
organization that has good safety procedures and practices which enable it to have greater
resistance to incidents and accidents, as well as being able to cope better when they occur
(Hollnagel, Paries, Woods, & Wreathall, 2011).
Proactive safety culture and safety resilience are key enablers for effective safety
management systems (SMS) implementation and continuous improvement. Under normal
conditions a positive safety culture is known to be reflected in proactive behavior and to serve as
indirect indicator of organizational resilience (Schwarz, Wolfgang, & Gaisbachgrabner, 2016).
This acceptable–level of safety requirements has necessitated a global advocacy for a shift from
prescription-based safety management among aviation certificate holders to a performance based
one to enhance operational flexibility and resilience (ICAO, 2013a; ICAO, 2013b).
Improving operational capabilities while ensuring a commensurate level of acceptable
safety within a resilient culture is one of the key attributes of a Safety Management System
(SMS). SMS is a formal, top-down, organization-wide approach to managing safety risk and
assuring the effectiveness of safety risk controls. It includes systematic procedures, practices,
and policies for the management of safety risk (FAA, 2015a). Collegiate aviation programs are
not under regulatory mandate by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to have an SMS.
However, SMS is required by certificate holders such as Part 121 airlines (Electronic Code of
Federal Register. Part 5, 2015). Some collegiate aviation programs have adopted the voluntary
SMS initiative promoted by the FAA due to the immense benefit derived in terms of proactive
risk management and building of a resilient safety culture in their operations (Adjekum, 2014).
Despite strenuous efforts to ensure an acceptable-level of safety in operations, there are
still un-anticipated safety risk in high reliability organizations (HROs) which are hazardous
organizations that operate almost error-free over long periods of time (Roberts, 1990). HROs are
entities that efficiently perceive changes in its environment and responds appropriately to them
and where accidents can be prevented through good organizational design and management (La
Porte, 1996; Weick & Sutcliffe, 2007). Examples of HROs are nuclear industry, oil and gas
industry and aviation. Programs that provide aviation training at the collegiate level can be
classified under generic aviation HROs. With the challenges of controlling these un-anticipated
safety risks, HROs should make every effort to build a safety resilient culture to sustain a
proactive safety system and prevent undesired safety events from re-occurring (Hollnagel,
Woods & Leveson, 2006).
Safety resilience ensures that HRO’s that operate in high risk environment such as
aviation training have robust safety defenses and controls to minimize their vulnerability to
adverse safety events. The topic of safety resilience within the aviation operational environment
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has been researched in extant literature (Akselsson, Koorneef, Stewart & Ward, 2009; Heese,
2012; Hollnagel, 2009; Hollnagel, 2014; Reason, 2011). The findings of these studies advocate
for robust and resilient safety systems as the next level in an organizational that has a fully
functional SMS program in place.
Reason (2011) provides a conceptual model of a safety resilience engine that drives an
organization’s safety program within a cultural context. Reason hypothesizes that these safety
cultural drivers (3Cs - commitment, competence and cognizance) are related to resilience in an
SMS program. An SMS that has reached the highest level of functionality and has all the various
components established, validated and effective needs to be continuously monitored and
improved due to changes in the operational environment (Schwarz & Kallus, 2015; Adjekum,
2017). Under the voluntary SMS program adopted by some collegiate aviation programs in the
U.S., the level of active conformance is attained when the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) acknowledges full implementation of the certificate holder’s SMS. The certificate holder
is expected to use organizational factors to build a strong safety resilience culture aimed at
reducing vulnerabilities (FAA, 2015b).
Changes such as financial status, national policies, quality of human resources, leadership
attrition and high–tempo operational activities may induce safety vulnerabilities (reductions in
the margins of safety that the safety controls can tolerate) (FAA, 2015a; Adjekum, 2017). Safety
resilience ensures that operational vulnerabilities due to increased activities are consistently
identified and managed. In the unfortunate scenario of an adverse safety event, an organization
that is resilient may still recover and operate effectively.
Research Problem
Extant studies on safety resilience in aviation have been mostly limited to commercial
aviation operations and air-traffic control management (Akselsson et al., 2009; Heese, 2012;
Hollnagel, 2009; Hollnagel, 2014; Reason, 2011). Specific studies on safety resilience in general
aviation such as collegiate flight training seems limited if not completely missing in the United
States. A search in extant literature suggests paucity in studies that assess the relationships
between the cultural drivers of safety (3Cs) and organizational safety resilience in a collegiate
aviation program with an active conformance SMS in the United States.
Research Objectives
Studies identifying areas of safety weaknesses and improvements in SMS of collegiate
aviation programs have been highly recommended (Adjekum, 2017). Determining the levels of
organizational safety resilience in an SMS accepted by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) as being in the active conformance status can be beneficial to a collegiate aviation
program. This study aimed at determining survey instrument items that loaded strongly on
cultural drivers of safety using Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA). Measurement models that
links these cultural drivers of safety and their underlying measured items were assessed for
goodness-of-fit.
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Another objective was to assess the strength of relationships between the cultural drivers
of safety and organizational safety resilience in a collegiate aviation program using Structural
Equation Model (SEM) techniques. A full structural model that showed the relationships
between the 3Cs and organizational safety resilience was proposed. Reason (2011) suggested
that there were also intrinsic relationships among the 3Cs. Mediation/ Path analysis (PA) was
used to explore these relationships. Finally, variations in perceptions of organizational safety
resilience in the collegiate aviation program among demographic variables such as age,
functional groups and gender were analyzed.
Research Questions
1. What is the effectiveness of measurement models of Reason’s cultural drivers of
safety resilience “Commitment, Cognizance and Competence” in a collegiate aviation
program with an active conformance SMS?
2. What is the strength of relationships between the variables Commitment, Cognizance
and Competence and the latent construct organizational safety resilience in a
collegiate aviation program with an active conformance SMS?
3. What is the strength of relationships between variables Cognizance and Competence
when mediated by Commitment in a collegiate aviation with active conformance
SMS program?
4. What is the variation in perceptions among demographic variables Age, Functional
Groups and Gender on the three cultural drivers of safety in a collegiate aviation
program with an active conformance SMS?
Literature Review
Vulnerabilities in safety defenses of any organization can precipitate errors and failures
which can have adverse effects on the functional capabilities of such organizations. These
vulnerabilities can cause tragic accidents, destroy value, waste resources, and damage reputations
(Coombs, 2007; Yu, Sengul & Lester, 2008). Many organizations systematically strive to avoid
failure, particularly when the consequences are severe, and some HRO’s are able to achieve
remarkably error-free operations even in the face of challenging conditions (Weick & Sutcliﬀe,
2007).
Extant research in safety science suggests that accident rates in “ultra-safe” systems (such
as commercial aviation and nuclear power) seem to be asymptotic at around ﬁve disastrous
accidents per 10−7 safety units of the system (Amalberti, 2001). These findings suggest that even
for safety-conscious and safety-critical organizations, there may be challenges to eliminate all
failures. This supports the assertions that accidents are inevitable in complex, tightly coupled
systems (Leveson, Dulac, Marais & Carroll, 2009; Perrow, 1984). That is why the interlink
between safety resilience and safety management becomes very relevant to be able to proactively
identify vulnerabilities and veritable management practices that shapes the cultural drivers of
safety in such organizations (Reason, 2011).
Reason (2011) posits that the engine that drives any safety initiative in an organization is
primed by the cultural core of an organization. Within the core are three driving forces namely;
commitment, competence and cognizance. Commitment has two components: motivation and
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resources. Motivation hinges on whether an organization strives to be a domain model for good
safety practices, or whether it is content merely to keep one step ahead of regulatory sanctions.
Resources on the other hand deals with the financial and human capital (caliber and status of
those people assigned to direct the management of system safety) in the organization.
A highly resilient safety program in an organization requires the technical competence
necessary to achieve enhanced safety. Paries, Valot and Deharvenght (2018) using a generic
taxonomy of safety management modes, within the French Air Navigation Service Provider
(ANSP), found out that formal SMS implementation did not include many of the HROs features.
However, the researchers also found out that in the real “life” of the organization, particularly at
operational levels (control rooms and maintenance units), most of the HROs features could be
observed as informal work or skills. Paries et al. (2018) further suggests some defining technical
competencies of HROs as follows:
a. Identification of hazards and safety-critical activities.
b. Preparations and contingencies for crises and linking of crisis plans closely to
business-recovery plans.
c. Ensuring the defenses, barriers and safeguards possess adequate diversity and
redundancy.
d. Creating a structure of the organization that is sufficiently flexible and adaptive.
e. Ensuring the right kind of safety-related information is being collected and
analyzed appropriately.
f. Getting this information disseminated and making sure it is acted upon.
Cognizance is the final driver within the cultural core that determines the need for an
organization to be adequately conscious of the dangers that threaten its activities and understand
the true nature of the struggle for enhanced resilience. An organization must always be in state of
intelligent wariness even in the absence of bad outcomes (Reason, 2011; Hollnagel, 2014). This
is the very essence of a proactive safety culture. Cognizance ensures that the primary goal of
safety management which is, maintaining a region of the safety space associated with the
maximally attainable level of intrinsic resistance, is achieved (ICAO, 2013a).
In their research on resilience within the healthcare industry, Smith and Plunkett (2019)
posits a link between cognizance and competence. Their study analyzes the distinction between
‘work as imagined’ and ‘work as done’ as originally suggested by Hollnagel (2009). ‘Work as
imagined’ assumes that if the correct standard procedures are known, understood and followed,
safety will follow as a matter of course. However, staff at the ‘sharp end’ of organizations know
that to create safety in their work, variability is not only desirable but essential. This positive
adaptability within systems that allows good outcomes in the presence of both favorable and
adverse conditions is termed resilience. They further argue that clinical and organizational work
can be made safer, not only by addressing negative outcomes, but also by fostering excellence
and promoting resilience through non-punitive safety reporting.
Even within industries where there are formally established safety practices such as
aviation and the offshore oil industry; practical skills, support from colleagues, the creation of
‘performance spaces’ and flexibility in problem‐solving (all rooted in the informal elements of
work) are important in maintaining safety (Hollnagel, 2009). Oliver, Calvard, and Potočnik
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(2017) in a study on cognition, technology, and organizational limits suggest that HRO’s may
hold important lessons for other organizations as they tread a path between developing
capabilities for safety resilience aimed at avoiding errors and subsequent failures.
They also suggest that controllers of complex systems, whether they are pilots or
executives, run the risk of becoming insulated from the systems that they oversee. For top-level
management executives, this might result in separation from front-line operations, such as when
responsibilities are delegated to units who largely follow established protocols, resulting in
organizational mindlessness (Sutcliﬀe, Vogus & Dane, 2016). This is where commitment needs
to mediate the relationship between cognizance and competence at all levels.
Oliver et al. (2017) further found out that vulnerabilities in highly complex systems are
sometimes not matched by the organization’s ability to organize and control them in the face of
most conceivable conditions, let alone unpredictable ones. As organizations and systems grow in
scale and complexity, the issue of how to develop an organization to handle unexpected and
extreme events grows ever more challenging.
The implication is that top-management executives should continuously monitor and
develop improvement strategies to respond appropriately to unusual conditions. The cultural
drivers, namely; competence by top-level management and cognizance at all levels within the
organization is paramount for ensuring the organizational safety goal of resilience. Finally, the
assessment of the strength of relationships among the cultural drivers of safety is suggested by
Reason (2011) as the SMS becomes fully-functional and there is a constant shift in safety space
between vulnerabilities and resilience.
Methodology
Research Design
A quantitative research design involving an online and anonymous survey was used to
elicit the perceptions of respondent on scale items related to safety resilience in a collegiate
aviation program. Likert scaled items (1= strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) were adapted
from Reason’s attributes of a proactive safety resilient organization (Reason, 2011) and a face
/content validity review was done by two SMS subject -matter experts (SME) with combined
working experience of almost 40 years as SMS training facilitators, researchers and collegiate
aviation faculty members. Based on recommendations from the review, some minor changes in
survey items sequencing were done.
The cultural driver Commitment has 9 items with “Personnel proactively discuss safetyrelated issues whenever the need arises” being an example of construct item. Competence has 7
items and an example of construct item is “There are standard operating procedures for recovery
from errors recognized which are reinforced by training.” The third cultural driver Cognizance
has 7 items and an example of construct item is “There are comparable procedures in place to
ensure safe transitions from the normal to emergency status.” Details of survey items used for
analysis is shown in Appendix A. A sample size greater than 300 was recommended as expedient
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to obtain meaningful fit of the measurement models based on Kline (2005) SEM
recommendations using model parameters.
Sampling and Survey Dissemination
A population of about 1850 comprised of students, faculty and supporting staff of a
collegiate aviation program in a large university located in the North-Western part of the U.S.
was sampled in this study. A convenience sampling approach was used to send an anonymous
online survey link via email to participants (aviation students, certified flight instructors, faculty,
maintenance, dispatch and top-level management) in the aviation program that also has an active
conformance level SMS accepted by the FAA.
The introduction of the survey had the research purpose, objectives and contact
information about the researchers. It also had a digital consent which provided the option to
accept or decline participation. For those who consented to participate, a hyperlink was provided
on completion of survey directing them to another site where participants could submit their
emails to win a $20 gift card in a random draw. The online survey was open for a three-week
period in the Fall semester of September 2019.
Data Collection and Preliminary Data Analysis
Relevant demographic data to assist in understanding the population was collected and
highlighted in this paper and will also be used in another study aimed solely at demographic
variations on safety resilience. At the end of the survey response period, the data was transferred
from the Qualtrics® survey site into IBM SPSS® version 26 software for preliminary screening.
The data was screened for multivariate normality using a combination of visual means such as
normality plots of histogram, kurtosis/skewness values and N-N plots (Fields, 2018). There were
no severe indications of non-normality or outliers in data that warranted transformations. IBM
SPSS® 26 analysis function for “pair-wise deletion of missing data” was used for the missing
data analysis. The full-information maximum likelihood approach using the IBM AMOS® V25
was used for model assessments, strength of relationships between measurement scale variables
(items), and the cultural drivers of safety (Enders & Bandalos, 2001).
Instrument Reliability, Construct Validity, and Goodness-Of- Fit Indices Criteria
The reliability of scale items underlying factors representing the cultural drivers that
generated acceptable fit for CFA models was determined. The outcomes from CFA models were
used to assess the reliability, convergent validity, and discriminant validity. A Cronbach’s alpha
(α) value of 0.7 or higher indicates good reliability of measured items (Nunnally, 1978) and
SPSS 26 was used to determine the reliability. Commitment (α = .85 for 7 items) and
Competence (α = .80 for 6 items) had good reliability. The factor Cognizance had a fair
reliability after the first analysis (α =. 54 for 5 items) and the reliability improvement function of
SPSS was used to delete the items cog 6 and cog 7. The next iteration improved the reliability (α
= .70 for 3 items) to an acceptable level.
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The average variance extracted (AVE) method was used to assess the convergent validity
(Fornell and Larcker, 1981). The AVE for commitment (.43), cognizance (.42) and competence
(.42) were all below the criteria suggested by Fornell and Larcker (AVE > .50). This result
suggests weak evidence of convergent validity. Using the Chin (2010) and Henseler & Sarstedt
(2015) recommendations of checking for cross-loading in the correlation matrix, some evidence
of discriminant validity also called “item-level discriminant validity” was observed. The
correlation matrix did not show any form of cross-loading of items among the constructs.
According to Gefen and Straub (2005), an item should be highly correlated with its own
construct, but have low correlations with other constructs in order to establish discriminant
validity at the item level. Hair, Ringle & Sarstedt (2011) recommends that the cut-off values of
factor loadings should be higher than .70.in that case. The evidence of weak convergence
validity should be taken into consideration when interpreting the results despite the evidence of
discriminant validity.
The items in each factor were summed up and used as indicator variables to assess the
relationship between cultural drivers and the over-arching concept of safety resilience. A model
containing all the individual measurement models was assessed for fit. Finally, the strength of
relationships and levels of interaction among the three cultural drivers were also assessed using
causal path analysis and Hayes Process V.3.4 in SPSS (Fields, 2018). A full structural model
showing relationships between cultural drivers of safety and safety resilience was proposed.
Annex A has all the measurement items retained after the reliability and validity assessment.
Annex B has details of correlation matrix highlighting lack of cross-loading among construct
items.
A large class of omnibus tests exists for assessing how well measurement models
matches observed data. The chi-squared (χ2) is a classic goodness-of-fit measure to determine
overall model fit. However, the chi-squared is sensitive to sample size, and it becomes difficult
to retain the null hypothesis as the number of cases increases (Kline, 2005). The χ2 test may also
be invalid when distributional assumptions are violated, leading to the rejection of good models
or the retention of bad ones (Steven, 2002; Brown, 2006; 2015).
Another commonly reported statistic is the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation
(RMSEA). A recommended value of 0.05 or less indicates a close fit of the model in relation to
the degrees of freedom (Brown, 2006; 2015). Another test statistic is the Comparative Fit Index
(CFI) that evaluates the fit of a user-specified solution in relation to a more restricted, nested
baseline model, in which the covariance among all input indicators are fixed to zero or no
relationship among variables is posited (Brown, 2006).
The fit index CFI ranges from 0, for a poor fit, to 1 for a good fit. Finally, the TuckerLewis Index (TLI) is another index for comparative fit that “includes a penalty function for
adding freely estimated parameters” (Brown, 2006, p. 85). Other indices are the Normed Fit
Index (NFI) and Incremental Fit Index (IFI). Hu and Bentler (1999) provided rules of thumb for
deciding which statistics to report and choosing cut-off values for declaring significance. When
RMSEA values are .06 or below, and CFI and TLI are .95 or greater, the model may have a
reasonably good fit. In this study, the TLI, χ2, RMSEA, CFI, NFI and IFI were reported for
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measurement models. If the model fit was not satisfactory, a post hoc analysis was performed to
modify the CFA model to make it better fit. Items with high error covariance were eliminated as
necessary.
Results and Findings
There were 519 responses at the end of the survey period. Out of the 519 responses, 516
respondents consented to undertake the survey (99.42%) and 3 declined (0.58%). Details are
outlined in Table 1. Out of the 516 positive responses, only 481 respondents provided details
about their functional personnel group. The details of the demography are outlined in Table 2.
Table 1
Consent to Participate in Anonymous Survey
Answer
Percentages (%)
Yes
99.42%
No
0.58%
Total
100%

Count
516
3
519

Table 2
Functional Group of Respondents
Functional Groups
Flight Operations (Aviation Students & Flight Instructors)
Top-level Management/Faculty (Administrative)
Operations Support Staff (Maintenance/Dispatch/Ground)
Total

Percentages
(%)
76.50%
9.56%
13.94%
100%

Count
368
46
67
481

There were 420 responses to this item on the survey and the demographic layout suggest
that majority of the student respondents to this item were juniors (29.05%). The breakdown of
responses, counts and percentages are outlined in Table 3.
Table 3
Student Academic Group
Answer
Freshman
Sophomore
Junior
Senior
Graduate
Total

Percentages (%)
15.00%
27.62%
29.05%
23.81%
4.52%
100%

Count
63
116
122
100
19
420

Respondents were asked to provide details about their highest flight certification and
ratings and the result suggest that majority of respondents were private pilot certificate holders
(46.90%). Among the other responses were participants with Airline Transport Pilot (ATP)
certification (7), Airframe & Power Plant (A&P) ratings (5), 1 respondent with Airframe and
Power Plant with Inspection Authorization (A&P IA) and 10 non-pilots. Figure 1 outlines details
of the demographic lay out.
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Figure 1. Highest Flight Certificate/Ratings Held

Age and Gender
Respondents were asked to provide their age as part of this study. There were 470
responses and results show a mean value close to 23 years (M =22.94, SD = 7.944) with a
median of 20 years. Result also showed that the modal class was the 20-year old respondents and
the highest age was 67 years. There were 396 male respondents (76.7%) as compared to 120
female respondents (23.3%). Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics for Age variable.
Table 4
Age distribution of Participants
Item
Value
Mean
22.94
Median
20.00
Mode
20.00
Std. Dev.
7.944

Question One
What is the effectiveness of measurement models of Reason’s cultural drivers of safety resilience
“Commitment, Cognizance and Competence” in a collegiate aviation program with an active
conformance SMS?
A first-order CFA was conducted to evaluate the strength of relationships between a set
of seven measurement items and the latent construct cognizance. A measurement model is
normally used to examine the relationships between the observed variables and the latent factors.
CFA allows researchers to test hypotheses about a factor structure (e.g., factor loading between
the first factor and first observed variable). Unlike an Exploratory Factor Analysis (EFA), a CFA
is theory-driven and produces several goodness-of-fit measures to evaluate the model. However,
it does not calculate factor scores (Brown, 2006; 2015).
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A five-item measurement model with good fit indices for cognizance was obtained after
the initial seven-item model did not yield a good fit. A post-hoc modification using the
Modification Indices (MI) function in AMOS recommended the addition of a covariance to the
error terms of items cog6 and cog7. The items cog 4 and cog5 were deleted due to extremely low
loadings and their adverse effect on fit indices. The final measurement model had good fit; χ2 (4,
N= 516) = 7.991, CMIN/DF = 1.998, p = .092, NFI = .971, IFI = .985, TLI =.943, CFI = .983,
RMSEA = .044 (.000 - .088). Figure 2 shows the measurement model and Table 5 shows details
of the factor loadings and squared multiple correlations (SMC or R2). All β are significant to
.000 level.

Figure 2. Measurement model of Cognizance
Table 5
Standardized Regression Weight and Squared Multiple Correlation of Cognizance
Measurement Item
(β)
R2
Cog 1
.504
.252
Cog 2

.683

.466

Cog 3

.781

.610

Cog 6

-.336

.113

Cog 7

-.220

.048

Note: All beta values are significant to p < .001 level

A final seven-item model with the best fit indices was obtained for the factor
Commitment after various competing models were assessed and post-hoc iterations were done
using MI and Reason’s theoretical framework. Figure 3 shows the measurement model and Table
A publication of the University Aviation Association, © 2020

132

Adjekum & Fernandez-Tous: Assessing Cultural Drivers of Safety Resilience in a Collegiate Aviation Program

6 shows details of the factor loadings and squared multiple correlations (SMC or R2). Details of
the competing models are outlined in Table 7.
Table 6
Standardized Regression Weight and Squared Multiple Correlation of Commitment
Measurement Item
(β)
R2
Comm 1
.695
.483
Comm 2

.618

.383

Comm 3

.701

.500

Comm 4

.644

.415

Comm 5

.736

.541

Comm 6

.561

.315

Comm 7

.622

.387

Note: All β are significant to p< .001 level
Table 7
Goodness-of -Fit Indices for Commitment
Iteration
Chi Square (Χ2)

NFI

IFI

TLI

CFI

RMSEA

Model 1

χ2 (0, N= 516) = not computed,
CMIN/DF = not computed, p = not
computed

.929

.944

.887

.943

.080 (.060 -.10)

Model II

χ2 (13, N= 516) = 51.520, CMIN/DF
=3.963, p < .001
(Covary e6/e7)

.939

.954

.898

.953

.076 (.055 -.098)

Model III

χ2 (12, N= 516) = 40.832, CMIN/DF =
3.403, p <.001
(Covary e6/e7; e1/e2)

.952

.965

.918

.965

.068 (.046 -.092)

Model IV

χ2 (11, N= 516) = 40.832, CMIN/DF =
1.937, p =.030

.975

.988

.968

.987

.043 (.013 -.069)

(Covary e1/e2; e4/e5; e6/e7)

http://ojs.library.okstate.edu/osu/index.php/cari

133

Collegiate Aviation Review International

Figure 3. Measurement Model for Commitment

A final six-item model with good fit indices; χ2 (9, N= 516) = 8.849, CMIN/DF = .983, p
= .451, NFI = .983, IFI = .995, TLI =.997, CFI = .998, RMSEA = .001 (.000 - .049) was
obtained for the factor Competence. There was no need for any post-hoc iterations using MI and
Reason’s theoretical framework. Figure 4 and Table 8 shows the measurement model and values
of β and R2 respectively.

Figure 4. Measurement Model for Competence
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Table 8
Standardized Regression Weight and Squared Multiple Correlation of Competence
Measurement Item
(β)
R2
Comp 1
.591
.350
Comp 2

.555

.308

Comp 3

.724

.524

Comp 4

.665

.448

Comp 5

.548

.300

Comp 6

.644

.415

Note: All β are significant to p < .001 level

Question Two
What is the strength of relationships between the variables Commitment, Cognizance and
Competence and the latent construct organizational safety resilience in a collegiate aviation
program with an active conformance SMS?
Scale items underlying each cultural driver of safety with good reliability and validity
were summed up to produce measured variables. The strength of relationships between these
measured variables (commitment, competence, cognizance) and latent construct safety resilience
were assessed using SEM/PA. The result suggests a significant predictive relationship between
measured variables and the latent construct safety resilience. A full structural model that
establishes the relationships between the cultural drivers of safety and the over-arching construct
safety resilience had an acceptable fit; χ2 (98, N= 516) = 375.877, CMIN/DF = 3.240, p = .000,
NFI = .840, IFI = .893, TLI =.841, CFI = .881, RMSEA = .059 (.050 - .073). Figure 5 shows the
full structural model.
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Figure 5. Final Structural Model of Relationships between 3Cs and Safety Resilience

The results from Figure 5 show that commitment and competence had the highest
.
standardized regression weight of .88 and .86 respectively.
Cognizance had the lowest
standardized regression weight of .78. All of these were significant at p = .000. The SMC values
and the standardized regression weight for all three cultural drivers are shown in Table 9. The
results suggest that when safety resilience goes up by 1 standard deviation, there is a
corresponding increase of .88 standard deviation in commitment. A unit standard deviation
increase in safety resilience produces a corresponding .86 standard deviation in competence and
.78 standard deviation in cognizance respectively. The R2 value of commitment suggests that
about 77% of the variances in commitment can be explained by predictors in the measurement
model of commitment.
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Table 9
Standardized Regression Weight and Squared Multiple Correlation of Safety Resilience
Factor
(β)
R2
Commitment
.876
.767
Competence
Cognizance

.862

.743

.789

.623

Note: All β are significant to p< .001 level

Question Three
What is the strength of relationship between variables Cognizance and Competence when
mediated by Commitment in a collegiate aviation with active conformance SMS program?
The PROCESS Version 3.4 for SPSS 26 (Fields, 2018) with bootstrap corrected
accelerated (BCa) value of 5000 was used for a mediation analysis to assess the strength of
relationships when commitment serves as a mediating variable between cognizance and
competence. This analysis was based on Reason’s suggestion that there exist intrinsic
relationships among the 3Cs. It also aimed at exploring the potential mediating role of
commitment in the relationship between cognizance (awareness) and competence of personnel in
a collegiate aviation SMS environment.
The exogenous variable was cognizance and the endogenous variables were commitment
and competence. The first model suggests a significant direct path between cognizance [β = .69, t
(334) = 17.43, p = .000, 95% BCa (.559 - .701)] and competence. The model summary was [ F
(1, 334) = 303.64, p < .001, R2 = .48] and shows about 48% of the variances of commitment is
explained by cognizance.
The path between cognizance [β = .31, t (333) = 6.58, p = .000, 95% BCa (.211 - .392)]
and competence was significant. The path between commitment [β = .54, t (333) =11.62, p =
.000, 95% BCa (.485 - .823)] and competence was also statistically significant. The model
summary [F (2, 333) = 270.78, p < .001, R2 = .62] shows about 62% of the variances in
competence can be explained by cognizance and commitment.
The standardized indirect effect of cognizance on competence was 0.375. Due to the
indirect (mediated) effects of commitment on competence, when cognizance goes up by 1,
competence goes up by about 0.38. The standardized indirect effect of cognizance on
competence was higher than the standardized direct effect of cognizance on competence (.302)
and validates the significant mediating role of commitment in the relationship. Figure 6 shows
the causal path of the variables.
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Commitment
.69***

.54 ***

Cognizance

Competence
. 30***

Note: all regression weights are significant; p < .001
Figure 6. Causal Path Diagram of Cultural Drivers of Safety Interactions

Question Four
What is the variation in perceptions among demographic variables Academic Levels, Functional
groups and Gender on the three cultural drivers of safety in a collegiate aviation program with
an active conformance SMS?
A one-way Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was conducted to determine if there existed
significant differences in the perceptions on dependent variables (3C) among demographic
variables academic levels, functional groups and gender. Only the functional group means
yielded significance and post-hoc analysis was conducted. The results show that there were
differences in the perceptions on commitment between the top-level management (M= 3.95, SE
=.487) and flight operations (M = 4.76, SE = .308).
In terms of cognizance there was a significant difference between the perceptions of toplevel management (M= 3.88, SE =.542) and flight operations (M = 4.74, SE = .339). There also
existed a significant difference in the perceptions of the top-level management (M= 3.89, SE
=.514) and operations support (M = 4.71, SE = .033) found in the cultural driver competence. An
independent t-test was conducted to find out if there existed any significant differences in the
mean of perceptions per gender. Result suggests no significant differences. Table 10 shows the
results of the ANOVA for all three factors.
Table 10
ANOVA for Functional Groups
Factors
Commitment

df1/df2
2, 336

F
3.840

Sig.
.002

Cognizance

2, 349

3.155

.008

Competence

2, 336

4.452

.001

Note: p < .05 (2-tail)
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Discussion and Conclusions
A structural model that assesses the strength of relationship between the cultural drivers
of safety and the overall construct of safety resilience showed a good fit to the data. The results
suggest that all the 3 cultural drivers have significant predictive relationship with safety
resilience with almost 88% of the proportion of variances in commitment explained by safety
resilience. About 86% of the variances in competence can be accounted for by safety resilience
and about 78 % of the variances in cognizance accounted for by safety resilience. The results
validate Reason (2011) concept of safety resilience and its relationship with cultural drivers of
safety. The findings of this study corroborate Hollnagel (2014) and Akselsson et al. (2009)
suggestions that safety resilience is an important element in the continuous monitoring and
improvements of SMS in aviation.
Results also suggest that it is very important for collegiate aviation programs to
constantly ensure that the mechanisms underlying resilience are assessed and improved. Cultural
drivers such as competence, cognizance and commitment should have metrics that needs to be
reviewed periodically during safety audits and SMS assessments to identify gaps and
misalignments with desired outcomes. Competence requires effective training and mentoring and
that leads to building the capacity of all personnel in the organization to be prepared and have
contingencies for situations that has adverse impact on organizational missions and goals as
posited by Adjekum (2017) and Stolzer & Goglia (2015).
The fact that cultural driver commitment significantly mediates the path between
cognizance and competence is also intuitive. It shows that even though a robust awareness or
educational program can be inherent in the SMS of a collegiate aviation, it may be inadequate as
a stand-alone to ensure competence of personnel in safety resilience. It will require motivation
from top-level management personnel, immediate supervisors and sometimes peers to enhance
competence. The provision of adequate material, financial and moral support also enhances
commitment to resilient practices.
Reciprocity in commitment is also required for personnel. Top-level management can
provide time and money for personnel training and development to build knowledge and skills.
These capacity-building resources ensures a safe working environment. Unfortunately, learning
and application cannot be forced and personnel must be self-committed to learning and
application of concepts to ensure competencies. Top-level management should provide
empowered accountability that allows personnel to recognize hazards and the authority to
mitigate the hazards. Such commitments also allow for work stoppage or deference to higher
supervision when risk mitigation is above competencies.
The results show that the mean perceptions of top-level management were relatively
lower for all three cultural drivers as compared to that of operations support and flight operations
(aviation students and flight instructors). However, it was only the difference between the toplevel management and operations support that was significant. This was quite surprising
considering that in a previous study that assessed perceptual gaps in a collegiate aviation safety
culture, top-level management had a better score than front-line personnel (Adjekum, 2017). The
findings of the Adjekum (2017) study suggested that top-level management as resource
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providers, deemed their efforts at sustaining safety culture adequate which was not reflected by
the perceptions of front-line personnel. In the present study, the assumption is that top-level
management may be privy to resource constraints and prospective strategic initiatives that can
pre-dispose aviation operations in their organization vulnerable, hence their seeming wariness as
compared to front-line personnel.
An example could be un-anticipated financial disruptions and aviation industry market
upheavals that can introduce vulnerabilities in aviation operations. To bridge the perceptual gaps
related to the cultural drivers of safety resilience and SMS, transparency in information flow and
periodic interaction between top-level management and front-line personnel is important.
Overall, the perceptions on all three factors that underly safety resilience namely; commitment,
cognizance and competence were good in the collegiate aviation program. It is highly
recommended that periodic assessments of safety resilience are performed to make operations
robust to such adversities.
Limitations and Generalizability of Findings
The findings of this study are based on perceptions of research participants from a single
collegiate aviation program. Also, majority of the respondents to the survey were collegiate
flight students and instructors who have relatively lower exposure to high tempo resilient
practices experienced in commercial airline or military flight operations. They may also have
minimal experiences with high impact safety occurrences that require higher levels of safety
resilience to ensure business continuity. Therefore, results from this study should not be
generalized across the aviation industry even though it can be relevant to other collegiate
aviation programs of scope and complexity.
The weak evidence of convergence validity should be taken into consideration when
making inferences on the findings in this study. It is recommended that future studies re-evaluate
survey items for convergent validity. The uneven sample size of the functional groups should be
considered when making inferences from the results of the ANOVA analysis. The majority of
the respondents were young aviation students and flight instructors (M=23 years) and their
perceptions on safety resilience and risk tolerability could have be shaped by psycho-social
factors such as exuberance, peer-pressure and high self-efficacy (Thomson, Önkal, Avcioğlu &
Goodwin, 2004; Adjekum, 2017; Wang, Zhang, Sun & Ren, 2018).
Implications of Study Findings for Research and Policies
This current study provides a veritable structural model with an acceptable fit and
provides a framework for future studies on organizational safety resilience in aviation. These
future studies recommended may include a comparative analysis of organizational safety
resilience in collegiate programs with active conformance SMS status, those going through the
voluntary process (active applicant and active participant) and those who are non-conformant
(without an accepted SMS program).
Such a study could also provide a plethora of literature and additional assessment tools
for organizational safety resilience in other certificate holders such as Airline Part 121, Air
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Traffic Management, Airports and Unmanned Aerial Systems operations. Another significant
benefit of this study is the capacity to assess operational vulnerabilities and strengthen safety
resilience in collegiate aviation programs as part of continuous monitoring and improvements of
SMS.
Funding: This work was supported by the John D. Odegard School of Aerospace Sciences,
University of North Dakota Seed Grant [# 21267-2205].
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Appendix A
Details of Measurement Items used in Assessment
Code
Measurement Item
Comm1
The safety mission statement is continually endorsed by top leadership’s
allocation of required resources (human/financial/technological)
Comm 2
Personnel proactively discuss safety-related issues whenever the need arises
Comm 3
Comm 4
Comm 5

Safety management issues are promptly attended to by top leadership without
constraints
Procedures are in place within the organization to facilitate continuing
professional development of personnel (new procedures/ techniques)
Procedures are in place to ensure that personnel under training attain preestablished competency standards

Comm 6

Trainees receive positive mentoring from instructors

Comm 7
Comp 1

Safety is recognized as being everyone’s responsibility not just that of the
safety management team
Top level leadership adopts a proactive stance towards safety

Comp 2

There are agreed standards for safety behaviors (acceptable/unacceptable)

Comp 3

Before any complex/unusual procedures, operational teams are briefed
accordingly
Operational teams are debriefed after a task where necessary

Comp 4
Comp 5

Procedures backed by constant reminders helps to keep personnel
knowledgeable in their job.

Comp 6

Useful feedback on lessons learned from safety events are quickly put into
practice by personnel

Cog 1

Policies ensure that supervisory personnel are present throughout high-risk
procedures.
There are standard operating procedures for recovery from errors recognized
which are reinforced by training

Cog 2
Cog 3

There are comparable procedures in place to ensure safe transitions from the
normal to emergency status (vice-versa)

*Cog 4R

Top leadership blame specific individuals who were involved in
accident/incidents rather than improving failed system defenses

*Cog 5R

Personnel are not informed by feedback on recurrent error patterns in
operations
R – Item was reverse coded; * Removed from final structural model due to low reliability
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Appendix B
Cross-Loading Analysis of Correlation Matrix; Chin (2010) & Henseler et al. (2015)
Commitment

Cognizance

Competence

Commitment

1

Cognizance

.690

1

Competence

.756

.678

1

Comm1

.710

.408

.453

Comm 2

.668

.407

.472

Comm 3

.734

.503

.538

Comm 4

.734

.553

.669

Comm 5

.715

.478

.532

Comm 6

.691

.457

.538

Comm 7

.690

.406

.456

Comp 1

.636

.521

.677

Comp 2

.550

.461

.659

Comp 3

.510

.526

.760

Comp 4

.497

.515

.733

Comp 5

.569

.410

.644

Comp 6

.468

.400

.745

Cog 1

.510

.754

.455

Cog 2

.595

.765

.615

Cog 3

.541

.837

.539
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